Introduction
Following what could be called a "Schumpeter (or Chandler, or Ford) era", spanning the period from the end of the nineteenth to the third quarter of the twentieth century 1 , during which larger size reigned supreme in productive organizations, the last few decades mark a general reversal towards smaller firm size.
By the end of the 1970s many changes impacted the organization of work within and between firms 2 , and an increasing number of symptoms have drawn attention, in many developed countries, to the emergence of a new role for the smaller firms in the production process, increasing their share of output while decreasing the economic weight of larger firms. Many authors in the 1980s and 1990s scrutinized various aspect of this general phenomenon. First, in a wide-ranging empirical survey, the OECD 1985 report signaled the increasing employment in small firms, while Piore and Sabel (1984) had earlier analyzed new modes of organization characterized by more flexibility and specialization. Then Sengenberger et al.
(1990) diagnosed a re-emergence of small enterprises, while many authors, especially in finance, described a disintegration trend in firms (often following mergers and acquisitions), either vertical (outsourcing, spinoffs) or horizontal (the surprising disappearance of conglomerates and the re-specialization and refocusing trends) 3 . Overall this broad change included a general downsizing replacing the previous quest for large scale, since the breakdown of existing firms gave way to smaller entities, an increased demand for qualified labor, and a significant reduction in the number of hierarchical levels in all organizations.
As Herbert Simon (1991) aptly emphasized, the market economy claimed back its role from the "organizational" (we would say "hierarchical") economy. That is to say (Meade, 1968) that the organization of production activities readjusted the balance which set "careful forward planning" against the "price mechanism" in favor of the latter, since, as Robertson(1928) had stated much earlier, "lumps of conscious power" are a substitute to the "ocean of market exchange".
Increasingly, the division of labor has been made "between firms rather than within them.
This phenomenon represents a major reversal with respect to what only thirty years ago appeared to be the only possible form of development of the industrial system: namely the primacy of large business organizations characterized by a high degree of both vertical and conglomerate integration" (Trau, 2003, p.25) . 4 A few authors, however, express some skepticism about the reality of the phenomenon. Baumol et al. (2003, p. 1) for instance, with regard to the US, write: "During the late 1980s
and, especially, the early 1990s, a wave of what was called "downsizing" swept -or allegedly swept -corporate America". And they present a detailed sector analysis showing mixed evidence (upsizing as well as downsizing, especially in services) for the American economy.
Should we thus conclude, as the authors hint, that it was basically a matter of temporary adaptation to increased technological innovation, openness and competition in the newly globalized economy? Was the same phenomenon also observable in other countries? Is it still going on today? And if so, what are the causes, or the cause?
The question is important for industrial organization, competition policy and general management. In this paper we first show, using data available until 2004, that the reversal continued unabated in the manufacturing sector of the US and of the three largest European countries, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. We then develop an information based model of the firm, complemented by a Coase-Rybczinski effect, to explain why technologythe information revolution -is the underlying cause of a shift and distortion in the size distribution of firms, and of the international "great reversal" of organizational structures.
Afterward, we test our theoretical assumptions using data on price and quantity of ICT equipments and panel estimation techniques. The last section concludes. 
The reversal vindicated

Figure 1
Average number of employees: firms with 20 employees or more.
(all manufacturing industry). Sources: Monnikhof and van Ark (1996) and Eurostat.
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The next four figures --2a, 2b, 2c & 2d --present the evolution of the average firm size for manufacturing sub-sectors in the UK, France, Germany and the USA. The size generally increased between 1962 and 1977 but a majority of sectors clearly show a downward trend after the seventies (1977): 91% of the sectors in France in our sample, 91% in UK, 75% in Germany and 71% in the USA. The evolution does vary depending on the sector. For example, in the sub-sector "office and computing equipments", the average size of firms has decreased by 93% in France, 77% in Germany and 67% in UK between 1977 and 2004. There are some exceptions such as the "drugs and medicines" sub-sector in which firms continued to grow after 1977 by 60%, 48.5% and 1.7% respectively in the three countries mentioned above. Finally, for some sectors, evolutions have diverged from one country to another. In the "railroad equipments" sub-sector, the average size has been increasing by 15% in Germany but decreasing by 17% in France and by 72% in the UK.
Figures 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d
Average number of employees, firms with 20 employees or more). Sources: Monnikhof and van Ark (1996) , Eurostat and US bureau of the Census. Authors' calculations. [
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Since the mid 1970, the manufacturing sector has contracted in the four countries studied. Germany and contracted in UK and in the USA, but at a lower rate than in the case of largest firms.
The drop in the number of small firms was certainly explained in part by the overall contraction of the manufacturing sector which has been stronger in UK than in other the countries. The average size of small firms increased in Germany and remained quasi constant in the US. It has decreased in France and in UK, but here again, the percentage is much lower than in the case of the largest firms and has to be brought in parallel with the general contraction in the manufacturing sector. Facts thus do seem rather uncontroversial: a downsizing trend replaced, after 1977, the previously upsizing one. It is due mostly to the decrease of employment in the higher deciles and increase of employment in the lower deciles.
This confirms previous studies. In the case of UK, France, Germany and Italy, indicate clearly that the largest firms accounted for a decreasing share of total manufacturing employment during the 90s. In the case of small firms, their share remained quite stable or increased, depending on the country.
Supporting Baumol et al. (2003) observations, Baldwin et al. (2002) show, for the US and Canadian manufacturing sectors, that between the 1970s and the 1990s, the share of small plants in total employment has been growing. Then, it remained stable during the 1990s. 6 In the perspective of Stigler"s "survivor principle", according to which the competition between firms of different sizes sifts out the more efficient enterprises, the data thus point to an overall reduction of the optimal firm size 7 and especially in the largest firms.
This begs the question of which are the determinants of firm size that can explain that evolution.
The determinants of firm size: prominence of technology factors
In their survey of what determines firm size, Kumar et al. (1999) classify extant theories of the firm broadly in three categories, as technological, organizational, and institutional, based on whether they focus on the production function, the process of control, or environmental influences.
It is not evident that the last two categories of factors, including asset specificity for instance, or legal and anti-trust environment, have been characterized by a sharp trend reversal occurring in the 1970s, that is necessary to explain the general trend reversal in firm size.
Moreover they could hardly explain such an overall change since the factors in the second category tend to be industry specific, while those in the third category should be mostly country specific. Such factors nevertheless have to be included in empirical tests as normalization variables in order to check for their possible influence on differences of size across sectors and across countries 8 .
The main common determinants of firm size are more likely technological, as suggested by Langlois (2003) . He considers that technology is the key driver of the "vanishing hand", i.e. a movement toward more market-centered organization of economic activities and away from the Chandlerian multidivisional corporation. Similarly, and commenting their observation of a larger share of small firms in manufacturing employment, in US and Canada, Baldwin et al. (2002) suggest that determinants of this trend should be looked for in technological factors, common to the two countries.
Among these technological factors Kumar et al. (1999) consider first the size of the market (following Adam Smith (1776) and Stigler (1951) ) which allows more specialization among workers. Specialization is productive in that it reduces the "set up" fixed costs incurred by workers when they change tasks. The extent of specialization being limited by the extent of the market and the size of the firm being linked to its use of specialized workers, we would expect firm size to be correlated with the overall size of the market. This prediction, however, appears to be contrary to what we have observed: the size of markets has been expanding with the economic growth of the last decades, while firm size consistently declined 9 .
Indeed, Smith"s prediction has been challenged by Becker and Murphy (1992) who point to the existence of multiple firms serving most markets to argue that specialization is not limited by the size of the market. In their theory, internal coordination costs play a major role in limiting the size of firms, before the size of the market becomes binding. It has to be shown then whether internal coordination costs have increased recently, which is rather counterintuitive since the costs of communication, and of internal storing and processing of information on computers, has been falling rapidly.
Focusing on the production function, Lucas (1978) explains the distribution of firm sizes by the distribution of "managerial talent" in the population. In his model, individuals make a choice between a managerial position and a salaried one, based on the comparison between managers/entrepreneurs" expected earnings (managerial rent) and employees" wage. In equilibrium, and for a given population, the average firm size is determined by the number of managers in the total workforce.
Lucas forecasts a general increase in firm size due to the accumulation of capital which increases labor productivity and therefore wages relative to profits. Indeed, this motivates talented individual to choose a wage earner position rather than an entrepreneurial one, and as the number of managers decreases, the average firm size increases. In the Baumol et al. (2003) framework, the size reducing impact of new technology should be felt mainly through a decreased revenue schedule for established, obsolete, firms, and because of "churning". As explained by the authors, however, technological innovation could increase as well as decrease the optimal size of firms: "When technology changes, sometimes bigger becomes better, but sometimes the reverse is true: smaller can become more beautiful" (op.cit.
p. 67). In the nineteenth century as railroads replaced animal-drawn vehicles in the US, firm size increased in the transportation industry, while after World War II, completion of the interstate highways system led to a replacement of railroad transportation by truck transportation, and thus to a dramatic reduction in firm size in the transportation industry.
This specific technological approach thus leaves us with a case by case analysis, making it difficult to explain the general move to smaller size. (2) dominates (1), and so no general theoretical conclusion can be drawn. This is not obvious however since it is difficult to see why a reduced cost of telephone calls, for example, should affect differentially calls within the firm and calls outside the firm.
Moreover Brynjolfsson et al."s empirical results are not conclusive. They study the evolution of establishments and firms" size in various US industries over the period 1976-1989, and consider investment in office computers, lagged and observed at the sub-sector level, as the main independent variable. They find that this investment exerts a strongly significant and negative effect on the size of establishments, but a non significant and both positive and negative correlation (depending on the investment lag) on firm size.
All these studies thus fail to explain the firm size "great reversal", either on theoretical grounds because the technological factors they consider exert in their models an ambiguous effect on firm size, or on empirical grounds because their predictions are either not conclusive or contrary to the observed facts of the recent decades.
In what follows, we develop a theory of optimal firm size evolution based on the changing cost of information impact on the production function and the input mix of the firm.
An information theory of firm size
What type of model is necessary to explain the observed evolution of firm sizes in general terms rather than on a case by case approach?
The Coase (1937) framework is based on the comparative market and organization costs of transactions and information. While it leads to ambiguous predictions regarding the impact of a falling cost of information on firm size, it can be modified to center the analysis on the input combinations of factors of production (including the information factor) that varies systematically with firm size. We are thus able to derive the non ambiguous Rybczinski effect of an increase in the quantity of information on the respective size changes of small and large firms.
Coase and the impact of information cost and quantity
A satisfactory model should build upon Coase, whose explanation of firms" existence by the cost of transactions (and information) on the market is generally accepted today. There are, two basic mechanisms by which productions can be coordinated in a specialized economy:
coordination by the price mechanism or coordination by an entrepreneur. Firms as centralized production processes exist because the hierarchical mode of production economizes on transactions. Coase hints to the fact that information costs (the costs of "discovering what the relevant prices are") are a main component of transaction costs. But we can add further that the other costs, the costs of contracting and negotiating contracts, are also information costs.
If complete information were available to all participants, there would be no need for negotiation, as all participants, cognizant of all relevant specific circumstances, would readily go for the best solution (the best contractual terms available). It follows that it is chiefly the cost of information that explains the existence of firms in the coasian perspective. Information (or the lack of it) is the single major determinant of the use of the centralized production process.
Since information is necessary to all producers, variations in its price could explain the choice, at the margin, of using more the price mechanism or the hierarchical mechanism, for all firms and all transactions. A rising cost of information should favor firm expansion, while a falling cost of information would favor firm contraction (outsourcing etc.). This results from the fact that the market mode of production relies on more transactions than the hierarchical mode, which, as noted by Coase, replaces a large number of bilateral contracts between individual suppliers of inputs with a smaller number of contracts between these suppliers and a central party, the entrepreneur. Accordingly, the decentralized market process necessitates more information, as we emphasize, than the centralized firm process. The firm reduces the number of contracts necessary for a given production and thus the amount of information, compared to what a decentralized market process requires. As a consequence, an increase in the quantity of information (a decrease of its cost) should reduce the dimension of all firms 10 .
But Coase then has to address the question of why there are many firms in the economy and not only one gigantic firm encompassing all productions, as soon as the market process is more costly than the management process. He reminds us that there are also management costs, or "diminishing returns to management" (as noted by Kaldor, 1934 and A. Robinson, 1934) , besides marketing costs. These rising managerial costs deter firms from growing without limits. He then claims that the size of firms is determined by a moving equilibrium between marketing costs (the costs of transactions on the market) and the managing costs, for the marginal transaction. The determination of firm size is due to a calculation at the margin of the relative benefits of integrating an additional transaction or outsourcing it to some other producer.
The balance between the marketing cost and the managing cost can be shifted of course by a change of their common basic component, the cost of information. The effect on size of such a change is ambiguous however since it affects both the cost of the market and the cost of managing. Coase gives the example of the telephone and the telegraph (footnote 26):
« It should be noted that most invention will change both the costs of organizing and the cost of using the price mechanism. In such cases, whether the invention tends to make firms larger or smaller will depend on the relative effect on these two sets of costs. For instance, if the telephone reduces the cost of using the price mechanism more than it reduces the costs of organizing, then it will have the effect of reducing the size of firms."
In this case the evolution of firm size becomes a priori indeterminate. It all depends on the specific characteristics of each information-augmenting technology. Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) are confronted with precisely this problem. In that case, no general rule can link the abundance of information (the main factor of divergence between the management process and the decentralized market process according to Coase"s first assertion) to the choice of one process over the other, and thus to the determination of average firm size.
The main criticism that we address to this theory is that it is difficult indeed to understand how a same technology -e.g. the telephone -can affect differentially the cost of a given transaction, depending on its taking place within the firm or with some external agent 
Information cost, input mix, and firm size
Small firms are more intense in information (and less intense in labor or capital) than large firms, for two reasons:
(a) Small firms rely more on outside procurement, and thus make more use of the market than large ones which are more integrated. They have to use more information per unit of output than large ones since they use a larger number of outside contracts (Coase) .
(b)
In their product market, we can assume that the same amount of information is necessary for all firms operating in a same sector, whether small or large.
This amount of information is bought only once for the whole firm, and used and replicated at will by the manager through his directives and orders to his subordinates, whatever their number (in the Rosen-like cascade multiplying the efficiency of subordinates by that of the manager).
It follows that the average cost of information is decreasing in firm size. There are strong economies of scale in information. The combination of factors in firms thus varies with firm size. The ratio of information to labor is higher for small firms and lower for large firms.
As a consequence, the decrease of the cost of information --whatever the details of the innovations which brought it about --, has a more cost-reducing effect on small firms than on large ones, and gives a competitive advantage to small firms. Then, borrowing from the theory of international trade, one may easily derive a "Coase-Rybczinski" theorem (Rosa, 2006 ) relevant in organization:
"with a lower cost of information (a higher quantity), large firms will downsize and/or disappear while small firms will upsize and new small firms will enter the economy. And the reverse is true".
In order to simplify the exposition, one may consider, in a same sector, two sub-sectors, one using intensively information (the small firms) and the other more intensive in labor (the large firms). The Rybczinski theorem then applies showing that an increase in the quantity of information will determine growth of the information intensive sub-sector and a contraction of the labor intensive sub-sector. This is because the information intensive firms will benefit more than the labor intensive ones from the fall in the price of information. They are thus able to attract employees from the large firms due to a superior competitive advantage.
We obtain an explanation of the facts observed: with the information revolution, the share of large firms in the economy contracted, while the share of the small ones increased. Not all classes of firms moved together simultaneously in the same downsizing direction.
Contrary to Coase (1937) and to Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) , we claim that the direction of the impact of information on firm size does not change with each specific innovation, but that all increases in the quantity of information, whatever the innovation characteristics, impacts differentially the costs of firms of different sizes because firms of different sizes have a different intensity in the use of information (thus Rybczinski).
Moreover this model can account for the simultaneous decrease of the large firms" share of employment and increase of the small firms" share, while the simple comparison of the cost of information in management and in the price mechanism could only forecast a general decrease of the sizes of all firms. Some more precision in the model can be obtained from a formal presentation.
A formal presentation of the model
Consider two firms j = 1, 2 operating in the same product sector but of different sizes, with output 1 x and 2 x such that 2 1 x x (e.g. 1 x = 1000 and 2 x = 500) and number of employees 1 L > 2 L (e.g. 1 L = 1000 and 2 L = 500). We assume for simplicity that labor is strictly proportional to output with a one to one correspondence.
In order to run their operation, they need another factor of production, information. To make a same product, different firms need the same kind of information and in the same quantity 1 The development and diffusion of ICT (microprocessors, computers, satellite communications, mobile phones), at a much lowered price, has led to a vastly larger quantity of information available in society. One may show easily that in theory, this increased abundance of the information factor of production favors the firms that are more informationintensive. Accordingly, smaller firms 2 will become both more competitive and more numerous relative to larger firms 1.
Competitiveness and the price of information.
Let w, the unit price of labor, be constant, p, the unit price of good X, be constant (the labor market and the product market are competitive, no economies of scale), and z, be the unit price of information. The unitary profit is:
Holding every else constant, the marginal profit for a variation of the price of information is:
which is higher for the smallest firm.
This result holds if one considers a continuum of firm sizes in the economy, instead of just two sizes, the value of i j continuously declines with the size of the firm (in output or employment), and thus the marginal profit for a variation of the price of information also declines with size. Large firms profit less from a falling price of information than smaller ones. In other terms, the relative costs (the dual of profitability) of large firms and small firms are changed to the detriment of the largest. While all firms have reduced their total costs due to the lower price of the information input, the gain is much more important for the smaller firms which benefit therefore from an increased competitiveness relatively to larger ones. It follows that the larger the firm, the more vulnerable from the competition of smaller firms it will be, and especially from the more intense competition of the smallest. This should result in the replacement of the firms in the largest deciles in the size distribution, for instance, by more firms in the smallest deciles. Large firms have to cut their size much to face the new competitiveness of smaller firms.
Consequences on the average size of firms.
Consider that a product sector X is composed of K sub-sectors k, and each k corresponds to different size-classes of firms. Each sub-sector k is thus composed of 
Taking the total differential:
Solving for these equations, one gets: This can explain the observed correlates of the downsizing trend: de-layering of the firm hierarchies, outsourcing, spinoffs, re-specialization and refocusing, end of conglomerates, as well as the increased demand for highly qualified labour and decreased demand for unqualified labour, while the sector of the smaller firms expands, all characteristic evolutions of the recent decades that other theories do not explain.
Empirical tests
Methodology and variables definition
In order to measure the size of firms, one can alternatively use gross output, value added or the number or the level of employment . The last one is preferable for our purpose, as coordination costs, the purpose of this paper, are linked to the number of employees, not to their productivity. We compute the average number of employees per enterprise, for enterprises with 20 employees or more in an industrial sub-sector. We have data for 27 manufacturing sub-sector (3 and 4-digit levels France, Germany, UK, 1967 -2004 In this first step, the average size of firms and the market size are observed at the sector level whereas all other variables are countrywide. Our model intends to measure the relationship between the level (price) of ICT equipments in the economy and the average size of enterprises for a given manufacturing sector, in a given country and for a given year, while controlling for market size, foreign competition, price of investments, human capital and industry-specific effects. The basic regression model is:
Size j,z,t = α + β i ICT j,t-i + γMarket j,z,t + ρINV j,t + δHUMCAP j,t + µTRADE j,t + ε t (1)
where Size j,t is the log of average firm size in country j, sector z and year t; ICT j,t-i is either:
i) The log of the number of telephone main lines per 100 habitants in country j and period t or,
ii) The price of ICT equipments or of computers, in country j and year t-i with i=0,1,2 or 3.
Following Kumar et al. (1999) , Market j,z,t is the log of total employment in a sub-sector z as a proxy for its market size in country j, at period t and HUMCAP j,t is the average schooling years of population aged over 25, as an indicator of human capital. If it determinates "talent for managing", we may expect a positive correlation with enterprise size. INV j,t is the investment price level in country j at period t, and according to Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) , it should discourage business expansion and lead to decline in firm size. TRADE j,t is the degree of trade openness of country j at period t. It is used as an indicator of foreign competition that leads to downsizing according to Brynjolfsson et al. and to Baumol et al. (2003) . Finally, ε t the error term. We introduce a sector fixed effect in the panel estimation procedure in order to control for potential factors that would not change over time.
We consider that heterokedasticity is a potential problem given that the size of the twenty seven sectors varies significantly in our data set. Following Brynjolfsson et al., we solve this difficulty using the weighted least squares correction technique. Each observation on a sector is weighted by the size of the sector, as proxied by a sector"s share in total employment (emp).
In order to do so, we first computed the average employment share (EMP) over the 27 sectors (for each country, each year) and multiplied each variable by its corresponding ratio (emp/EMP). This procedure is correcting for heterokedasticity while providing efficient parameter estimates.
In this first step, we conduct two sets of regressions, the first one using the diffusion of telephone lines and the second using prices of ICT equipments and of computers.
Results
The Table 2 presents the results of weighted panel OLS regressions with sector fixed effect, and using the number of main telephone lines as explanatory variable. The first three columns differ with the year (t, t-1, t-2) at which this variable was observed. This allows us to account for a potential lag in the influence of telecommunication equipments diffusion on firm size.
We use only one of these alternative measures at a time in order to avoid problem of collinearity. The estimated coefficient for this variable is negative, as expected, and significant. Over this long period, the development of telecom equipments accompanied firms" downsizing.
The positive estimates for Market size are also conform to theoretical predictions and strongly significant. We observe a positive and significant estimated coefficient for investment price.
This suggests that a lower cost of investment has a downsizing effect on firms due to a factors substitution effect. The estimated coefficients for trade openness and human capital are not significant.
The fourth column presents the results of a test in which we introduced countries" real GDP per capita as an additional explanatory variable in order to account for Lucas (1978) assumption. The estimated parameter is negative, contrary to expectations, but not significant.
The correlation matrix (not shown here) reveals that this variable is strongly correlated with human capital and trade openness. Kumar et al. (1999) suggest that market size, measured by employment, can be endogenous.
Indeed, some external factors influencing the size of firm could affect a sector"s total employment as well. To avoid this problem, we instrument market size with the log of population and of GDP and we conduct weighted 2SLS (two stages least-squares) regressions.
In order to avoid correlation problems with the two instrumental variables, we omit human capital and trade openness. The last three columns present the results of regressions for various measures of the number of main telephone lines. The results remain robust. In two stages least-squares (2SLS) regressions, market size is instrumented.
The Table 3 presents the results of similar regressions but using the prices of computer and of ICT equipments as explanatory variables. We find positive and significant estimated coefficients for these two variables, confirming that a cheaper access to information and communication technologies favoured firms downsizing. We introduce a country fixed effect in the analysis to account for structural differences between countries such as institutional factors. Kumar et al. (1999) suggest indeed that the efficiency of the judicial system, the regime of patents protection, the quality of accounting standards, the statutory corporate taxes, and the level of regulatory constraints may influence the size of firms 13 . Table 4 
6.3
Second Sample: France, Germany, UK, USA, 1990 -2004 In a second step of our empirical study, we conduct econometric tests using the price of ICT equipments and of computers and a different set of explanatory variables observed at the sector level (3 or 4-digit level) selected following Kumar et al. (1999) (2) Market is the log of market size, Wage the log of wage per worker, Investment the log of investment per worker, and Trade the degree of trade openness. We use a corruption perception index as a measure of the degree of rule enforcement (country wide). We omit
Human capital given the problem of correlation previously raised 14 .
The data set covers 27 sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry, over the period 1990-2004, for France, UK and USA (four years observed) and Germany (three years observed).
Results
We conduct panel weighted 2SLS regressions, with sector fixed effect. The weight is the same as before and the variable Market is instrumented using the log of GDP and of population. The Table 5 presents the results of 6 different regressions, each one involving a different set of variables. The second column gives the results of regression (1) of model (2) (all variables included).
The matrix of correlation (not shown here) reveals cross correlation between the variables investment per worker, wage per worker and degree of trade openness. In particular, there is a negative correlation between Trade openness and wage, consistent with Baumol and al. (2003, p.17) explanations. Low-wage labor abroad exerts a downward pressure on wages and this pressure is stronger in sectors more exposed to trade competition. In order to correct for this collinearity problem, the next four regressions (2) (3) (4) (5) consider only one of these three variables at a time. In all the regressions, the estimated coefficients for the variables ICT price
and Market size are positive and strongly significant. They range between 0.135 and 0.242 for the latter variable and between 0.123 and 0.251 for the former. The estimated coefficient for CORRUPTION is positive and significant (except for regression (1)). These results are contrary to Beck et al. (2002) predictions. Omitting this variable doesn"t affect the results as shown in column (5).
In regression (2), we omit Investment and trade openness, and the estimated coefficient for
Wage per worker is positive and significant. In regression (3), we omit Investment and Wage and find a significant positive correlation between firm size and trade openness. These two results are contrary to Baumol et al (2003) predictions.
In regression (4), we omit trade openness and wage and we find a strongly significant negative estimated coefficient for Investment per worker 15 . This confirms the assumption of a capital for labor substitution effect that led to downsizing.
In order to check for the robustness of our results, we use the price of computers instead of ICT equipments (actually, computer price enters in Jorgensson"s calculation of ICT equipments" price). The results shown in the last column (6) (a positive and significant coefficient for computer price), confirm our previous results. A better access to information, either due to a lower price of ICT equipments or a higher diffusion of these equipments, led to a downsizing of firms in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. This supports our assumption on the role of information costs in the decision to internalize versus outsource activities.
Our empirical results confirm that market size and investment (per worker), are also determinant factors in this decision, and consistent with prediction by the theoretical literature. However, our results for corruption, wage per worker and trade openness are contrary to expectations, but must be considered cautiously. We add a country fixed effect and conduct OLS linear regression. Table 6 presents the results which remain robust for the incidence of ICT equipments and computer prices.
Finally, in order to control for some potential correlation problem in the dataset, we use the panel-corrected standard errors procedures. The results, presented in table 7, indicate that our results on the incidence of the prices of computers and ICT equipments remain robust. 
Remarks
A corollary of our theory is that an increasing availability of information should exert a differentiated effect on small and large firms" share of total employment, expanding the share of small firms and contracting that of large ones. We do not however directly test this distortion effect since necessary data are not available throughout the period. But empirical evidence in other work is compatible with our prediction.
In their cross sector study of the US economy 1992, while the largest category of 10,000 employees or more has clearly been downsizing.
We thus consider that available evidence is in favor of our corollary regarding the information induced distortion of the firm size distribution.
Conclusion
Using industrial panel data (27 sub-sectors, 3-4 digit on four countries --France, Germany, UK and USA --for the 1967 to 2004 period), we test our information based theory of the determinants of firm size. Contrary to extant theories that find an ambiguous effect of information on firm size, depending of the precise characteristics of each innovation (Coase),
we derive a general, size reducing effect of an increase on the quantity (and decrease of the cost) of information on average firm size, in accord with Langlois (2003) . Our analysis also contradicts the theories that predict a general increase of average firm size (Smith, Lucas) in a growing economy.
Using other determinants of firm size found in the literature as normalizing variables, we
show the role of information as a determinant of size and thus as the factor explaining the new downsizing trend that started in the 1970s in industrialized countries and continued in the 1990s, replacing the previous upsizing trend. Specifically, we find that: i) the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants has a robust negative and significant effect on average firm size and, ii) that the price of ICT equipments and of computers has a positive and significant impact. 
Sector variables
Average size of firms: Monnikhof and van Ark (1996) 1977 , 1996 , 2000 and 2004 . For Germany, 1967 , 1977 , 2000 and 2004 . For the United Kingdom, 1968 , 1977 , 1996 , 2000 Market size: The total employment in a 3(4)-digit industry. The construction is the same as above. Data are from Monnikhof and van Ark (1996) , Eurostat and the US Census Bureau.
Some missing values where completed using the STAN database. For example, in the case of France and Germany, for tobacco and Oil and refineries. The year 1996 for Germany.
